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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS),1 invoked by human rights advocates as a 
dynamic means of enforcing customary international law (international 
law),2 permits aliens (non-U.S. citizens) to file civil claims in U.S. courts for 
violations of international law.3  Not all violations of international law are 
cognizable under the ATS; only misconduct that exhibits a particularly 
identifiable and strong transnational dimension (e.g., impacting the mutual 
interests of nations) and that is sufficiently egregious is actionable pursuant 
to the ATS.4  The type of misconduct alleged usually involves human rights 
abuses.5  As a type of litigation that touches a spectrum of issues, including 
corporate governance, international law, and complex human rights issues, 
ATS litigation has engendered intense analysis and spirited scholarship.6  
                                                                                                                   
 1 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”).  The terms Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and Alien Tort 
Claims Act refer to the same statute and are used interchangeably in literature about the topic.  
This Article references it as the ATS.   
 2 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 116 n.3 (2d Cir. 2010) (“In this 
opinion we use the terms ‘law of nations’ and ‘customary international law’ 
interchangeably.”); see also David H. Moore, Medellín, the Alien Tort Statute, and the 
Domestic Status of International Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 485, 486–87 (2010) (“The statute has 
provided the practical context in which the debate over [customary international law]’s 
domestic status has occurred.”).  While often relied upon in the human rights context, the ATS 
was originally utilized and is equally valid in commercial contexts.  Matt. A. Vega, Balancing 
Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether Transnational Corporations Are Liable for 
Bribery Under the Alien Tort Statute, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 385, 393–94, 429, 447 (2010). 
 3 28 U.S.C. § 1350.  The full text of the ATS reads: “The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”  Id. 
 4 See Joel Slawotsky, The New Global Financial Landscape: Why Egregious International 
Corporate Fraud Should Be Cognizable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 17 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 131, 132 (2006) (explaining that only claims that implicate the “mutual concern of 
the nations of the world” are permitted under the statute); see also id. at 154 n.163 (quoting 
case law that notes the transnational and egregious elements). 
 5 However, the statute itself does not limit the type of conduct.  See Vega, supra note 2, at 
388 (opining that global bribery may be cognizable under the ATS).   
 6 See, e.g., M. Anderson Berry, Whether Foreigner or Alien: A New Look at the Original 
Language of the Alien Tort Statute, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 316 (2009) (discussing the 
difference between the definitions of “foreigner” and “alien” as it relates to the ATS); Lucien 
J. Dhooge, The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Modern Transnational Enterprise: 
Deconstructing the Mythology of Judicial Activism, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 3 (2003) (suggesting 
that courts confronted with ATS claims have provided adequate guidance to global 
corporations); Tyler Giannini & Susan Farbstein, Corporate Accountability in Conflict Zones: 
How Kiobel Undermines the Nuremberg Legacy and Modern Human Rights, 52 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. ONLINE 119 (2010), http://www.harvardilj.org/2010/11/online_52_giannini_farbstein/ 
(examining the effect that a recent ATS case may have on corporate accountability in conflict 
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For more than two decades, U.S. courts have held that, in addition to 
individuals,7 private corporations owe duties under customary international 
law and have liability under the statute.8  In recent years, corporations have 
become prime defendants and the focus of ATS litigation.9  Clearly, 
presuming that they may face potential liability under the ATS, corporations 
have both settled and proceeded to trial, rather than moving to dismiss.10  
Both Yahoo!11 and Shell Oil12 settled ATS suits filed against them, while 
Chevron13 and Drummond Corporation14 proceeded to trial and obtained 
defense verdicts. 
                                                                                                                   
zones); Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A 
Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353 (2011) (challenging the view 
that the ATS imposes liability on corporations for violations of customary international law); 
Moore, supra note 2, at 486–87; Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and International Human 
Rights Litigation: A Critical Appraisal, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1928 (2007) (noting that 
ATS litigation “is the most prominent and effective means for litigating international human 
rights claims”); Slawotsky, supra note 4 (arguing that the default of not recognizing ATS 
claims related to financial fraud is no longer valid); Vega, supra note 2 (arguing that an alien 
should be able to bring an ATS claim for personal or economic injuries based upon foreign 
bribery).   
 7 See, e.g., In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1473 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the 
district court had jurisdiction over former Philippines president Ferdinand Marcos under the 
Alien Tort Act and that “ ‘[t]he prohibition against official torture carries with it the force of a jus 
cogens norm, which enjoys the highest status within international law’ ” (citation omitted)). 
 8 See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(subjecting two foreign holdings companies to jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act); 
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999) (“No logical reason exists 
for allowing private individuals and corporations to escape liability for universally condemned 
violations of international law merely because they were not acting under color of law.”). 
 9 See, e.g., Doe v. Nestlé, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (labor abuses on 
cocoa plantations); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 3541 (2010) (pharmaceutical testing on children without informed consent in Nigeria); 
Catherine Rampell, Yahoo Settles with Chinese Families: Firm Gave Officials Dissidents’ E-
Mails, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2007, at D04 (disclosure of political dissidents’ e-mail records 
in China); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 509 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2007) (provision of 
vehicles and spare parts to apartheid South Africa). 
 10 See Rod Khavari, Comment, Executive Order 13303: Is the Bush Administration 
Choosing Corporations over Human Rights Actions Instituted via the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 
14 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 119, 129 (2006) (“Transnational corporations and the U.S. 
government have felt that the [ATS] is an awakening monster, threatening corporations and 
their investments as opposed to being the savior for human rights victims and survivors.”).   
 11 Rampell, supra note 9. 
 12 Jad Mouawad, Shell Agrees to Settle Abuse Case for Millions, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, 
at B1.  
 13 Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (“These plaintiffs 
brought claims under the [ATS], Nigerian law, and California law.  The jury rendered a 
verdict in favor of Chevron on all claims, and Plaintiffs now appeal. . . . We . . . affirm the 
district court’s judgment.”).  
 14 Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[O]ne claim for relief 
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Overturning its precedent,15 the Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co.—a virtual earthquake of an opinion—held that corporations 
do not have obligations under international law and, thus, cannot have 
liability under the ATS.16  In Kiobel, the majority held that pursuant to 
Supreme Court ordered guidance in the Sosa opinion,17 federal courts are to 
examine international law to decide the question of whether that “ ‘law 
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the 
perpetrator being sued.’ ”18  The Kiobel court, relying upon that footnote, 
examining international law, and citing to international criminal tribunals,19 
treaties,20 and scholarship,21 found such law did not encompass corporate 
liability.22  The court held “[f]rom the beginning . . . the principle of 
individual liability for violations of international law has been limited to 
natural persons—not ‘juridical’ persons such as corporations.”23  According 
to the Second Circuit, it is now up to Congress to decide whether the statute 
can impose corporate liability, but “[f]or now, and for the foreseeable future, 
the [ATS] does not provide subject matter jurisdiction over claims against 
corporations.”24  Lower courts in the Second Circuit have dismissed cases 
based upon the Kiobel decision.25 
Taken to its logical conclusion, Kiobel holds that corporations can 
conduct business any way they deem proper without concern of liability 
under the statute.  As noted by Tyler Giannini and Susan Farbstein, “the 
decision create[d] unprecedented opportunities for corporate actors to shield 
                                                                                                                   
that Drummond aided and abetted the killings, which were war crimes, remained.  At a trial of 
that claim, the jury returned a verdict for Drummond. . . . We affirm.”). 
 15 See, e.g., In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“On 
at least nine separate occasions, the Second Circuit has addressed [ATS] cases against 
corporations without ever hinting—much less holding—that such cases are barred.”). 
 16 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), reh’g denied, 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc 
denied, 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 2011).  Judges Cabranes and Jacobs formed the majority.  Id.  
Judge Leval joined in the dismissal based upon a lack of evidence that the defendant acted 
purposely to aid and abet the alleged wrongful conduct.  Id. at 153–54.  Judge Leval disagreed 
with respect to corporate liability.  Id. at 149–53. 
 17 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).   
 18 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 120 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20).   
 19 Id. at 132–37.   
 20 Id. at 137–41. 
 21 Id. at 142–45. 
 22 Id. at 148–49. 
 23 Id. at 119. 
 24 Id. at 149. 
 25 See, e.g., In re Motors Liquidation Co., 447 B.R. 150, 153 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(disallowing underlying claims under binding Kiobel precedent). 
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themselves from liability for clear abuses of international law through 
incorporation.”26  
Kiobel’s ruling has academic support.  For example, Julian Ku supports 
the Kiobel ruling and argues against corporate liability under the ATS.27  Ku 
argues that international law is applicable only to states. He believes that 
although individuals “may” have liability under certain limited 
circumstances, corporations cannot.28  “Non-state parties, such as private 
individuals, organizations, or corporations, owe duties under only domestic 
laws and cannot violate international law directly.”29 
Notwithstanding this scholarly support, there are compelling reasons to 
conclude that corporations should have liability under the ATS.  There is 
nothing to indicate that corporations were excluded by the statute and the 
available evidence indicates that, to the contrary, corporations were always 
envisioned as part of the class of potential ATS defendants.30  In addition, the 
zealous reliance by Kiobel on the Sosa footnote is misplaced.  The footnote 
does not stand for the proposition that federal courts should examine 
international law to find whether a class of defendants, such as corporations, 
can be sued under the statute.  Rather, the Supreme Court merely articulated 
that international law should be examined to determine whether the type of 
misconduct at issue can be allocated to various actors such as public or 
private entities.31  Moreover, international law does not mandate the manner 
of its enforcement; such mechanisms are reserved for the individual states to 
implement.   
                                                                                                                   
 26 Giannini & Farbstein, supra note 6, at 121. 
 27 Ku, supra note 6, at 354–55 (“For over two decades, U.S. courts have held that private 
corporations owe duties under customary international law and can be subject to lawsuits 
under the [ATS]. . . . Despite this wide support, the view that corporations can be liable for 
violations of customary international law under the ATS is wrong.”).  But see Roger P. Alford, 
Apportioning Responsibility Among Joint Tortfeasors for International Law Violations, 38 
PEPP. L. REV. 233, 234 (2011) (“There is no question that international law grants rights and 
imposes duties on entities other than states.”). 
 28 Ku, supra note 6, at 355 (“Indeed, customary law has only endorsed direct private-actor 
liability in the context of international criminal law, and even this somewhat-uncertain 
liability extends only to natural persons.”). 
 29 Id. at 364. 
 30 See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(“All but one of the cases at our level hold or assume . . . that corporations can be liable.”). 
 31 See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 263 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The 
citation to Sosa’s footnote 21 indicates only that the district court considered the views of 
those governments in assessing ‘the collateral consequences that would result from finding a 
new international law violation,’ and does not suffice to demonstrate that the court (again 
contrary to its stated intentions) adopted sub rosa the defendants’ political question 
arguments.” (citation omitted)). 
2011] CONUNDRUM OF CORPORATE LIABILITY  181 
 
Regarding international law and corporate liability, the Kiobel court’s 
reliance on international criminal rulings to prove corporations are not liable 
under international law is misplaced because criminal law is fundamentally 
different from civil tort law and the ATS is a civil liability statute.  
Moreover, corporations are subject to civil law and, increasingly, criminal 
law.  International law unquestionably protects corporate rights, and, 
therefore, corporations should be subject to obligations.  Finally, the 
distinction between “states” and “corporations” cited by liability opponents 
is outdated and does not comport with our globalized world.  The distinction 
is blurred as the roles of states and corporations are interchangeable.  
This Article is divided as follows: Part II provides an overview of the 
ATS including a review of the recent major appellate decisions on corporate 
liability.  In Part III, the Article addresses the question of whether 
corporations should be liable under the ATS.  The Article points out that 
several persuasive reasons militate in favor of finding corporate liability.  
These reasons include the following: the fact that nothing in the ATS 
suggests that corporations should be excluded; the absence of proof that 
courts need to consult international law on the issue; the fact that 
corporations do have obligations under international law; and the erosion of 
the formalistic distinction between “state” actors and “private” actors.  Part 
IV provides a brief conclusion. 
II.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ALIEN TORT LITIGATION  
The ATS provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law 
of nations or a treaty of the United States.”32  The statute allows non-U.S. 
citizens to sue defendants in federal court for tortious conduct constituting a 
violation of international law or a treaty.  For nearly two hundred years, 
relatively few cases were filed pursuant to the ATS.33  This relative 
dormancy ended when, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit issued 
a landmark ruling whereby the statute was relied upon to find that state-
sponsored torture was actionable.34  The issue in Filartiga was whether 
torture constituted a “ ‘violation of the law of nations’ ” and was, thus, 
cognizable under the ATS.35  For the case to be actionable, plaintiffs needed 
to establish that there was an international consensus with respect to torture 
                                                                                                                   
 32 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 33 See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting the dearth of cases). 
 34 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).  
 35 Id. at 878 (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1350 (2006))). 
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being a violation of international law.36  According to the Second Circuit, “It 
is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of 
mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express international 
accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an international law 
violation within the meaning of the [ATS].”37 
Filartiga held that, in determining whether specific conduct constitutes a 
violation of international law when there are no relevant treaties or other 
laws, a court should examine judicial opinions, scholarly works, and 
custom.38  Significantly, the court stated that international law has to be 
applied as it is used “today” and not from two hundred years prior,39 noting 
that international law evolves over time.40  The Second Circuit accordingly 
found that torture was a “well-established, universally recognized norm[ ] of 
international law,” which was cognizable under the statute.41 
After Filartiga, plaintiffs vigorously commenced filing ATS cases.  Such 
cases included ones against government officials alleging various human 
rights abuses.42  Plaintiffs also commenced suits against corporations that 
usually alleged that the defendants aided and abetted the government or 
officials in violating international law.43  
In Sosa, the Supreme Court held that the statute grants jurisdiction to 
federal courts44 and permits them to adjudicate cases brought by aliens for a 
few specific violations of international law, noting such law was part of 
federal common law.45  The Court observed that at the time of its enactment 
the statute was intended to encompass the three primary and 
contemporaneous violations of international law: piracy, offenses against 
ambassadors, and violations of safe passage.46  However, the Court endorsed 
the Filartiga view that international law develops over time and held courts 
were available to entertain claims for violations of “present-day law of 
nations” so long as they “rest on a norm of international character accepted 
by the civilized world and define with a specificity comparable to the 
                                                                                                                   
 36 Id. at 888. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 880–81. 
 39 Id. at 881. 
 40 Id. at 881, 887. 
 41 Id. at 888. 
 42 See, e.g., In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 43 See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 44 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713–14 (2004). 
 45 Id. at 720. 
 46 Id. 
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features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”47  Sosa cited 
approvingly to Filartiga: “The position we take today has been assumed by 
some federal courts for 24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided 
Filartiga . . . .”48  Simultaneously, the Court urged caution with respect to 
embracing the types of international law violations that should be 
cognizable.49  The Court provided some guidance: to come within the ambit 
of the ATS, a violation should “rest on a norm of international character 
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to 
the features of the 18th century paradigms.”50  
Thus, subject to diligent gatekeeping, the federal courts were empowered 
to adjudicate cases brought by aliens for violations of international law other 
than the three original paradigm examples.  Since the Sosa decision, a variety 
of such claims have been filed, and the courts continue to grapple with many 
vigorously debated issues including whether local remedies must be 
exhausted prior to filing an ATS suit and whether the ATS contemplates 
secondary liability (and, if so, whether the standard of liability should be 
knowledge or purpose).51  Some of the litigation filed against corporations 
has included: claims against a pharmaceutical company for the failure to 
obtain informed medical consent for drug testing that resulted in death and 
serious personal injuries;52 claims that a multinational energy company aided 
and abetted a government scheme to torture and murder political dissidents;53 
claims that an energy company aided and abetted crimes against humanity by 
fueling military equipment used to commit these acts;54 and allegations that a 
multinational high-tech corporation colluded with a government to track 
down a religious group’s members who were later tortured and murdered.55  
Until the Kiobel ruling, corporations were presumed by courts and litigants 
to be within the sphere of potential defendants in ATS suits.56  However, the 
                                                                                                                   
 47 Id. at 725. 
 48 Id. at 731. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 725. 
 51 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing, via the Kiobel concurring opinion, these debated issues). 
 52 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3541 
(2010). 
 53 Mouawad, supra note 12.  
 54 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 122 (2010). 
 55 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Doe v. Cisco Systems, Inc., No. 11-CV-02449, 
(N.D. Cal. May 19, 2011), 2011 WL 1338057; Richard Blackden, Cisco Sued by Religious 
Dissidents for Helping China Monitor Internet, TELEGRAPH (May 23, 2011), http://www.telegra 
ph.co.uk/finance/china-business/8532114/Cisco-sued-by-religious-dissidents-for-helping-China-
monitor-internet.html. 
 56 See supra note 8 (noting cases that have held, either implicitly or explicitly, that 
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Kiobel ruling, discussed below, cast serious doubt as to ATS claims against 
corporate defendants.  
A.  The Kiobel Decision: Corporations Cannot Have Liability 
1.  Majority Opinion 
Plaintiffs, residents of the Ogoni Region of Nigeria, filed suit under the 
ATS against international oil corporations for allegedly aiding and abetting 
the Nigerian government in committing violations of international law.57  
Purportedly, the conduct occurred during the suppression of resident protests 
in the 1990s against the environmental degradation of the area.58  Defendants 
were accused of aiding and abetting the conduct by providing payment, food, 
and transportation to the Nigerian military.59  Plaintiffs claimed that, among 
other offenses, government soldiers beat, raped, and murdered civilians.60   
The Second Circuit rejected the claims against the corporate defendants 
and provided a two-step analysis.  First, the court referenced and adopted a 
footnote in the Sosa ruling, wherein the Court stated that federal courts must 
examine international law to decide the question of whether that “law 
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the 
perpetrator being sued.”61  Kiobel, thus, held that the question of whether 
corporations could be liable in a U.S. court must be determined by 
international law. 
Second, the court evaluated international law by reviewing decisions of 
international tribunals,62 treaties,63 and scholarship.64  The Kiobel ruling 
found that corporate liability is not part of international law.65  The court 
referenced the fact that the London Charter, which established the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (NMT),66 permitted jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                   
corporations may have liability under the ATS).   
 57 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 126 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004)). 
 62 Id. at 132–37. 
 63 Id. at 137–41. 
 64 Id. at 142–45. 
 65 Id. at 145.  This Article does not engage in a review of Kiobel’s possible misstatements 
of international law.  For an excellent review of those potential misunderstandings regarding 
the holdings of the international tribunals, see Andrei Mamolea, The Future of Corporate 
Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Roadmap, 51 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 79, 100–11 (2011), and Giannini & Farbstein, supra note 6. 
 66 Agreement for the Prosecution of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Annex, 
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to the tribunal only over natural persons.67  The court relied heavily upon the 
fact the NMT declined to impose liability on corporations and, instead, 
focused on individual liability.68  Since Nuremberg, international tribunals 
have consistently sought to hold only individuals liable for violations of 
international law.69  The court referenced the fact that the jurisdictions of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International 
Criminal Court are limited to natural persons, noting that ICTR and ICTY 
charters expressly limit jurisdiction to “natural persons.”70 
Kiobel also relied on the NMT’s decision to refuse the imposition of 
corporate liability on I.G. Farben (Farben).  The Farben entity was 
referenced in Kiobel as “the most nefarious corporate enterprise known to the 
civilized world.”71  Farben manufactured the agent that the German military 
used to asphyxiate detainees at concentration camps.72  The majority stated: 
 The refusal of the [NMT] to impose liability on [Farben] is 
not a matter of happenstance or oversight.  This corporation’s 
production of, among other things, oil, rubber, nitrates, and 
fibers was harnessed to the purposes of the Nazi state, and it is 
no exaggeration to assert that the corporation made possible the 
war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by Nazi 
Germany, including its infamous programs of looting 
properties of defeated nations, slave labor, and genocide.73 
                                                                                                                   
Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Charter]. 
 67 See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 133–34 (relying significantly on the London Charter to prove that 
international law is applicable only to individuals and not to corporations, basing the natural 
persons argument on the Charter’s use of the terms “persons,” “individuals,” and “members”).  
Id. The Court noted that the London Charter “grant[ed] the tribunal jurisdiction to ‘try and 
punish persons . . . whether as individuals or as members of organizations.’ ”  Id. (quoting 
London Charter, supra note 66, art. 6). 
 68 Id. at 134–35.  For a novel discussion as to the reason the NMT decided to pursue 
individuals and not Farben, see infra notes 170–74 and accompanying text.   
 69 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 136.   
 70 Id.; see also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
S.C. Res. 827, art. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (“The International Tribunal shall 
have jurisdiction over natural persons . . . .” (emphasis added)); Statute of the International 
Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (“The 
International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have jurisdiction over natural persons . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 71 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 135. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 134. 
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The majority continued: 
But [Farben] was not charged, nor was it named in the 
indictment as a criminal organization.  In issuing its judgment, 
the [NMT] pointedly observed that “the corporate defendant, 
Farben, is not before the bar of this Tribunal and cannot be 
subjected to criminal penalties in these proceedings.”  The 
Tribunal emphasized: “We have used the term ‘Farben’ as 
descriptive of the instrumentality of cohesion in the name of 
which the enumerated acts of spoliation were committed.  But 
corporations act through individuals and, under the conception 
of personal individual guilt . . . the prosecution, to discharge 
the burden imposed upon it in this case, must establish by 
competent proof beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual 
defendant was either a participant in the illegal act or that, 
being aware thereof, he authorized or approved it.”74 
The court found that “[n]o corporation has ever been subject to any form 
of liability (whether civil, criminal, or otherwise) under the customary 
international law of human rights.”75  The NMT did not impose liability on 
Farben, but, rather, prosecuted its management.76  Based upon its analysis of 
the NMT and other international tribunals, Kiobel held that a corporation (as 
opposed to natural persons) cannot have liability under international law.77  
The Kiobel court then examined treaties and noted that international 
treaties may offer some evidence of international law depending upon how 
many nations have ratified such treaties and whether they are customarily 
enforced.78  The court conceded the existence of some treaties incorporating 
corporate liability.79  However, the court was not persuaded because “that 
those treaties impose obligations on corporations in the context of the 
treaties’ particular subject matter tells us nothing about whether corporate 
liability for, say, violations of human rights, which are not a subject of those 
treaties, is universally recognized as a norm of customary international 
law.”80  The court found that despite “provisions imposing corporate liability 
                                                                                                                   
 74 Id. at 135 (quoting United States v. Krauch (The Farben Case), 8 N.M.T. 1081 (1952) 
(emphasis added by Kiobel)). 
 75 Id. at 148. 
 76 Id. at 135. 
 77 Id. at 148–49.   
 78 Id. at 137. 
 79 Id. at 138. 
 80 Id.  
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in some recent specialized treaties,” these treaties fail to demonstrate that 
corporate liability is a norm of international law.81   
Kiobel next turned to legal scholarship.82  The court explored the opinions 
of two international law experts (who were representing a corporate 
defendant in an unrelated case),83 and found their opinions convincing.  Each 
expert had submitted affidavits in a different ATS litigation and opined that 
international law does not recognize corporate liability.84  The majority 
opinion also referenced law journal articles and found that the proponents of 
corporate liability were either counsel to plaintiffs or expressed the view that 
corporate liability was a goal rather than a norm of international law.85  
However, the Kiobel court was not unanimous on these issues.  The next 
section discusses Judge Leval’s vigorous objections to the majority’s no 
liability holding. 
2.  Judge Leval’s Concurrence 
Judge Leval joined in dismissing the suit, but for evidentiary reasons.86  
Plaintiffs did not allege that the defendants actively or directly participated in 
the wrongdoing.  Rather, they accused the defendants of aiding and abetting 
the conduct.87  Judge Leval, citing to the Second Circuit’s requirement that to 
impose secondary liability plaintiffs must establish a that a defendant acted 
“with a purpose,” found such evidence lacking.88  He stated: 
We recently held in [Talisman] that liability under the ATS 
for aiding and abetting in a violation of international human 
rights lies only where the aider and abettor acts with a 
purpose to bring about the abuse of human rights. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                   
 81 Id. at 139. 
 82 Id. at 142. 
 83 The procedural backdrop to the Kiobel opinion is unconventional.  See Giannini & 
Farbstein, supra note 6, at 120 n.1 (describing the procedural backdrop of Kiobel).  The court 
addressed the issue sua sponte—the issue was neither briefed nor before the Second Circuit.  
Id.; see also Erin Foley Smith, Right to Remedies and the Inconvenience of Forum Non 
Conveniens: Opening U.S. Courts to Victims of Corporate Human Rights Abuses, 44 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 145, 160 (2010) (“The decision came as a surprise to advocates, 
particularly because neither party to the case had raised or briefed that particular issue.”).  The 
Kiobel court relied upon the expert opinions of a corporate defendant in the unrelated 
Talisman litigation.  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 143–44.  
 84 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 143. 
 85 Id. at 144 nn.47–48. 
 86 Id. at 153–54 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 87 Id. at 123 (majority opinion). 
 88 Id. at 154 (Leval, J., concurring). 
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the Supreme Court ruled in [Ashcroft v. Iqbal] that a complaint 
is insufficient as a matter of law unless it pleads specific facts 
supporting a plausible inference that the defendant violated the 
plaintiff’s legal rights.  Putting together these two rules, the 
complaint in this action would need to plead specific facts that 
support a plausible inference that the Appellants aided the 
government of Nigeria with a purpose to bring about the 
Nigerian government’s alleged violations of the human rights 
of the plaintiffs. . . . [T]he allegations of the Complaint do not 
succeed in meeting that test.  I therefore agree with the 
majority that the claims against the Appellants must be 
dismissed, but not on the basis of the supposed rule of 
international law the majority have fashioned.89 
Further, Judge Leval disagreed with the majority’s claim that corporations 
can have no liability under the statute.  He noted that under the holding, 
corporations could potentially get away with the most outrageous misconduct 
simply by acting in a corporate form.90  Judge Leval argued that the 
majority’s position was judge-made rather than a reflection of international 
law:   
[T]here is no basis for this contention.  No precedent of 
international law endorses this rule. No court has ever 
approved it, nor is any international tribunal structured with a 
jurisdiction that reflects it.  (Those courts that have ruled on the 
question have explicitly rejected it.)  No treaty or international 
convention adopts this principle.  And no work of scholarship 
on international law endorses the majority’s rule.  Until today, 
their concept had no existence in international law.91 
He criticized the majority’s reliance on the various international tribunals 
saying that those bodies were looking to impose criminal responsibility as 
opposed to civil compensation.92  According to the concurrence, a crucial 
                                                                                                                   
 89 Id. (citations omitted). 
 90 Id. at 149–50 (“According to the rule my colleagues have created, one who earns profits 
by commercial exploitation of abuse of fundamental human rights can successfully shield 
those profits from victims’ claims for compensation simply by taking the precaution of 
conducting the heinous operation in the corporate form.”).  
 91 Id. at 149–51. 
 92 Id. at 163. 
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distinction exists between criminal and civil jurisdiction because 
corporations are not the customary focus of criminal punishment.93 
In addition, Judge Leval stated that, while international law norms are 
established by international law, the method of implementation is not 
mandated by international law.94  He commented:  
[I]nternational law says little or nothing about how those norms 
should be enforced.  It leaves the manner of enforcement, 
including the question of whether there should be private civil 
remedies for violations of international law, almost entirely to 
individual nations.  While most nations have not recognized 
tort liability for violations of international law, the United 
States, through the ATS, has opted to impose civil 
compensatory liability on violators and draws no distinction in 
its laws between violators who are natural persons and 
corporations.95   
Thus, according to Judge Leval, international law determines whether the 
conduct constitutes a violation of international law, but each state, pursuant 
to that sovereignty’s domestic law, determines which actors can be 
defendants and what rules of enforcement are permitted.96  Since American 
tort law controls, and corporations may have liability under U.S. law, 
corporations may have liability under the statute.  Expectedly, the decision 
was contested immediately.  The following section describes the post-Kiobel 
reverberations. 
3.  Post-Ruling Procedural Developments in Kiobel  
In a 5–5 split, the Second Circuit denied a petition for an en banc 
rehearing.97  The dissenting judges stated that “this case presents a significant 
issue and generates a circuit split” and referred to Judge Leval’s concurrence 
as “scholarly and eloquent.”98  According to the dissenting judges, the two-
judge majority opinion in Kiobel was “very likely incorrect as to whether 
corporations may be found civilly liable under the [ATS] for violations of 
                                                                                                                   
 93 Id. at 166–67. 
 94 Id. at 152. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 98 Id. at 380 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
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such fundamental norms of international law as those prohibiting war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.”99 
One dissenter, Judge Katzmann, referred to the issue as one “of 
extraordinary importance” and added an intriguing element to the dissent.100  
He stated that the Kiobel majority’s reliance on his concurring opinion in 
Khulumani to support the no-corporate-liability view was wrong.101  
According to Judge Katzmann, there is “no inconsistency between the 
reasoning of [his] opinion in Khulumani and Judge Leval’s well-articulated 
conclusion, with which [he] fully agree[s], that corporations, like natural 
persons, may be liable for violations of the law of nations under the 
[ATS].”102  The statements of the dissenting judges leave no doubt that they 
believe corporations may be liable under the statute. 
Plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari;103 the defendant filed its brief in 
opposition;104 and plaintiffs filed the reply brief.105  The Court will need to 
decide whether to address the corporate liability issue or to defer the 
question.  
Parallel to the certiorari petition, two appellate court rulings handed down 
rulings in the same week that both questioned Kiobel’s analysis and 
conclusion.  Those two rulings are discussed in the next section.  
4.  The View from the D.C. and Seventh Circuits: Kiobel Is Wrong 
In the aftermath of Kiobel, “[r]umors of corporate liability’s demise in the 
context of ATS litigation” were rampant.106  Several scholars sided with 
Kiobel’s holding or presumed that it would sway other appellate courts to 
rule similarly.  For example, Julian Ku noted: “In a blockbuster opinion that 
could spell the end of the vast bulk of [ATS] litigation, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that corporations cannot be liable for 
violations of customary international law under the [ATS].”107  According to 
                                                                                                                   
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. (Katzmann, J., dissenting). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 380–81. 
 103 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. 
June 6, 2011), 2011 WL 2326721. 
 104 Brief of Respondent in Opposition, Kiobel, No. 10-1491 (U.S. Aug. 12, 2011), 2011 WL 
3584741. 
 105 Reply Brief of Petitioner, Kiobel, No. 10-1491 (U.S. Sept. 2, 2011), 2011 WL 3948605. 
 106 Joel Slawotsky, Rumors of Corporate Liability’s Demise in the Context of Alien Tort Suits 
Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY BLOG (July 20, 2011), http://lcba 
ckerblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/guest-essay-joel-slawotsky-rumors-of.html. 
 107 Julian Ku, Goodbye to the Alien Tort Statute? Second Circuit Rejects Corporate Liability 
for Violations of Customary International Law, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 17, 2010), http://opiniojuris.o 
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another scholar, “[t]here’s going to be a huge reduction in [ATS] litigation if 
[Kiobel] holds up.”108  Roger Alford opined that “[t]he slow, quiet demise of 
the ATS continues.  Without further support from the Supreme Court, it 
appears that the statute is in free fall.”109  However, two July 2011 cases 
suggest that the rumors of the ATS’s demise vis-à-vis corporate liability have 
been premature.110 
In the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber 
Co., the court held that corporations may indeed have liability in ATS 
suits.111  Describing Kiobel as an “outlier” opinion, the court did not mince 
words.112  It stated that the factual premise of the majority opinion in the 
Kiobel case is incorrect.113 
The court completely disagreed with the Second Circuit and found that 
international law had in fact been used by the NMT to punish 
                                                                                                                   
rg/2010/09/17/goodbye-to-ats-litigation-second-circuit-rejects-corporate-liability-for-violations-o 
f-customary-international-law/. 
 108 Stephen Bainbridge, No Corporate Liability Under Alien Tort Statute?, 
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbai 
nbridgecom/2010/09/no-corporate-liability-under-alien-tort-statute-contrast-citizens-united.html. 
 109 Roger Alford, Torture by Non-State Actors Not Actionable Under ATS, OPINIO JURIS (June 17, 
2011), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/06/17/torture-by-non-state-actors-not-actionable-under-ats/. 
 110 Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 111 Flomo, 643 F.3d. at 1013.  The court also rejected defendant’s argument that the ATS could 
not be applied extraterritorially.  “Courts have been applying the statute extraterritorially (and not 
just to violations at sea) since the beginning; no court to our knowledge has ever held that it 
doesn’t apply extraterritorially; and Sosa was a case of nonmaritime extraterritorial conduct yet 
no Justice suggested that therefore it couldn’t be maintained.”  Id. at 1025.  The Flomo ruling 
rejecting the extraterritoriality argument makes sense.  As referenced infra text accompanying 
note 118, it would seem counterintuitive to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality.  See 
Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010) (“When a statute gives 
no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”).  However, the presumption is 
rebuttable.  As noted by the Supreme Court, to rebut the presumption, plaintiffs are not required 
to show that Congress used specific language to the contrary, i.e., that the statute explicitly states 
overseas conduct is covered.  Plaintiffs can overcome the presumption if the text and/or context 
lead to the conclusion that the drafters’ intent was to allow extraterritorial application of the 
statute.  “Assuredly context can be consulted as well.”  Id. at 2883.  Both the text and context 
support Flomo’s rejection of the extraterritoriality argument.  The plain text of the ATS allows 
aliens to file claims for violations of international law.  Such violations would presumably take 
place overseas.  Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in Sosa, the intent of the drafters was to 
allow aliens to file claims for several cardinal offenses.  One of these paradigmatic offenses is 
piracy which occurs outside the borders of the United States.  See supra text accompanying note 
46.  Based upon both the plain text of the ATS and its context, it would be odd if the enactment 
of the ATS was done with the intention that it not cover overseas conduct.  
 112 Flomo, 643 F.3d. at 1017. 
 113 Id. 
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corporations.114  Using uncomplicated words, the court used the following 
analogy:  
If a corporation complicit in Nazi war crimes could be 
punished criminally for violating customary international law, 
as we believe it could be, then a fortiori if the board of 
directors of a corporation directs the corporation’s managers to 
commit war crimes, engage in piracy, abuse ambassadors, or 
use slave labor, the corporation can be civilly liable.115 
The D.C. Circuit, in Doe v. Exxon, also held corporations may indeed 
have liability in ATS suits.116  Exxon delivered another blow to Kiobel, 
calling the Second Circuit’s Kiobel opinion internally inconsistent and 
illogical.117  The court found that the analysis in Kiobel 
conflates the norms of conduct at issue in Sosa and the rules for 
any remedy to be found in federal common law at issue here; 
                                                                                                                   
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 1019.  Interestingly, the court noted “the plaintiffs concede that corporate liability 
for such violations is limited to cases in which the violations are directed, encouraged, or 
condoned at the corporate defendant’s decision making level.”  Id. at 1020–21.  This suggests 
the court had in mind the doctrine of vicarious liability and was leaving open the possibility of 
limiting corporate liability to circumstances when directors or senior officers ratify or approve 
the wrongful conduct. 
 116 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  The court initially addressed Exxon’s argument that 
the ATS does not apply based upon the presumption against extraterritoriality.  “Citing 
Morrison, Exxon contends that a ‘strong presumption . . . against extending [federal statutes] 
to encompass conduct in foreign territory’ militates against recognizing a common law aiding 
and abetting claim based on human rights violations committed in a foreign country.”  Id. 
at 21 (citation omitted).  The court rejected Exxon’s argument citing to the legislative history 
surrounding the enactment of the TVPA (implicitly endorsing the ability of hearing ATS 
claims based upon conduct in foreign countries) and Sosa’s implicit rejection of the 
extraterritoriality argument (citing to the U.S. government’s brief in Sosa which no Justice 
apparently agreed with).  Id. at 26.  Applying the presumption against extraterritoriality in 
ATS cases does not appear to comport with the intent of Congress.  The statute allows aliens 
to sue for damages based upon violations of international law which naturally would be 
envisioned to take place outside the United States.  See Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified 
Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019 (2011) (arguing that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality should not apply to ATS litigation because the ATS implements 
international law which naturally involves foreign nations and is thus distinguishable from 
statutes relating to domestic concerns). 
 117 Exxon, 654 F.3d at 50–55 (noting “a number of problems with the analysis in Kiobel”).  
“In sum, the majority in Kiobel not only ignores the plain text, history, and purpose of the 
ATS, it rests its conclusion of corporate immunity on a misreading of footnote 20 in Sosa 
while ignoring Sosa’s conclusion that federal common law would supply the rules regarding 
remedies.”  Id. at 54–55. 
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even on its own terms, its analysis misinterprets the import of 
footnote 20 in Sosa and is unduly circumscribed in examining 
the sources of customary international law.118 
Citing both scholar Louis Henkin and Judge Edwards’ concurrence in 
Tel-Oren,119 the Exxon court concluded that international law itself provides 
no remedies for its violations.120  Rather, individual nations are to determine 
whether and how such violations should be addressed.121  The court stated: 
[T]he ATS provides federal jurisdiction where the conduct at 
issue fits a norm qualifying under Sosa implies that for 
purposes of affording a remedy, if any, the law of the United 
States and not the law of nations must provide the rule of 
decision in an ATS lawsuit.   
 Consequently, the fact that the law of nations provides no 
private right of action to sue corporations addresses the wrong 
question and does not demonstrate that corporations are 
immune from liability under the ATS.122  
The court held the domestic remedy for violations of international law is 
left for the individual nations and that, therefore, the ATS may be used to 
enforce international law norms.123  According to Exxon, Kiobel is inherently 
contradictory inasmuch as the Kiobel majority concedes that individuals 
from a corporation may have liability.  If, as the court in Kiobel admits, 
individuals have liability, then a juridical entity may also have liability.124  
The decision is noteworthy in that in broad terms, it embraces the ATS 
plaintiffs’ bar arguments that corporations may have liability under 
international law citing to the physical destruction and confiscation of 
corporate assets of Farben by the Allied forces after World War II.125 
                                                                                                                   
 118 Id. at 41.  
 119 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring). 
 120 Exxon, 654 F.3d at 41–42.  
 121 Id.  
 122 Id. at 42. 
 123 Id. at 54–55. 
 124 Id. at 55. 
 125 Id. at 52–53; see also id. at 52 n.42 (citing Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of 
Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1239 (2009)) (noting in the Nuremberg process indicates that 
corporations are not liable for violations of international law). 
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Both the Flomo and Exxon opinions sharpen the circuit split with Kiobel 
and support the need for court-ordered resolution of the corporate liability 
question.  Given the significance of the issue, it is likely the Supreme Court 
will have to provide much-needed guidance.  In the following Part, the 
Article explains why corporations should be liable under the ATS.  
III.  DO CORPORATIONS HAVE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS? 
Both courts and parties have presumed that the statute is applicable to 
corporations.  For example, both Yahoo! and Shell Oil settled ATS suits filed 
against them.126  On the other hand, Chevron proceeded to trial and obtained 
a defense verdict.127  Drummond Corporation also proceeded to trial and 
obtained a defense verdict.128  These defendants presumed corporations may 
have liability under the ATS or they would have moved for dismissal.  Yet as 
Kiobel ruled, and some scholars opine, corporations ought not to have 
liability under the ATS.  Notwithstanding this opposition, as the next section 
discusses, the historical record is void of evidence supporting that position. 
A.  The Absence of Proof That the Drafters Intended to Exclude 
Corporations   
There is nothing in the ATS itself, in any congressional amendments, or 
in the historical record to indicate such a restrictive view of the statute.  
Since corporations were in existence at the time the ATS was enacted,129 and 
                                                                                                                   
 126 Corporations have settled cases and gone to trial presumably based on the premise that a 
corporate defendant may have liability under the statute.  See, e.g., Mouawad, supra note 12 
(describing a settlement paid by Shell in order to avoid a trial where allegations of their 
involvement in the murder of a pro-environmentalist were at issue); Rampell, supra note 9 
(detailing a large settlement paid by Yahoo! in order to avoid a trial where allegations of their 
involvement in giving the Chinese government dissident information were at issue).  
 127 Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (“These plaintiffs 
brought claims under the [ATS], Nigerian law, and California law.  The jury rendered a 
verdict in favor of Chevron on all claims, and Plaintiffs now appeal. . . . We . . . affirm the 
district court’s judgment.”).  
 128 Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[O]ne claim for relief 
that Drummond aided and abetted the killings, which were war crimes, remained.  At a trial of 
that claim, the jury returned a verdict for Drummond. . . . We affirm.”).   
 129 For a similar rationale, see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 
926–27 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The lack of a textual exception for speech by 
corporations cannot be explained on the ground that such organizations did not exist or did not 
speak.  To the contrary, colleges, towns and cities, religious institutions, and guilds had long 
been organized as corporations at common law and under the King’s charter . . . . The dissent 
offers no evidence—none whatever—that the First Amendment’s unqualified text was 
originally understood to exclude such associational speech from its protection.”). 
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the ATS did not exclude corporations, one could infer the statute was not 
intended to exclude corporations.130 
Moreover, the purpose of the statute was to provide redress in the federal 
courts for aliens who had suffered a violation of their rights under 
international law.  Conferring immunity on corporations conflicts with this 
purpose.  For example, from its enactment, the ATS was applied to some 
private actors, such as pirates.131  To distinguish between a private individual 
engaged in piracy and a corporation engaged in the same misconduct does 
not advance the statute’s goals. 
Supporting the view that corporations may have liability is an Attorney 
General position cited by Sosa which clearly envisioned corporate plaintiffs.  
Sosa referenced the 1795 Attorney General opinion of William Bradford: 
Bradford . . . was asked whether criminal prosecution was 
available against Americans who had taken part in the French 
plunder of a British slave colony in Sierra Leone.  Bradford 
was uncertain, but he made it clear that a federal court was 
open for the prosecution of a tort action growing out of the 
episode: “But there can be no doubt that the company or 
individuals who have been injured by these acts of hostility 
have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States; 
jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts in all cases 
where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the law of 
nations, or a treaty of the United States . . . .”132 
Under this opinion, corporations could be plaintiffs in a civil action filed 
pursuant to the ATS.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that corporations 
have a right to sue under the statute, finding congressional intent in 
authorizing “aliens” to be plaintiffs in ATS suits included corporations as 
well.133  It would be surprising if corporations wielded the advantage of 
                                                                                                                   
 130 For a review of historical references in U.S. law demonstrating that international law was 
not “limited” to natural persons and, in fact, includes private corporations, see Jordan J. Paust, 
NonState Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion, 51 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 977, 985–89 (2011).  
 131 See Martha Lovejoy, Note, From Aiding Pirates to Aiding Human Rights Abusers: 
Translating the Eighteenth-Century Paradigm of the Law of Nations for the Alien Tort Statute, 
12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 241, 243 (2009) (noting liability to entities that helped pirates). 
 132 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 721 (2004) (first emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
 133 Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 106 (1898) (holding that the term “aliens” in the 
Judiciary Act has “always been held by this [C]ourt to include corporations”). 
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being a plaintiff while simultaneously enjoying immunity from suit.134  As 
the Supreme Court has held, “The [ATS] by its terms does not distinguish 
among classes of defendants . . . .”135   
Corporate liability is ever more sensible today.  Corporations wield 
enormous power in our globalized, free enterprise-oriented world.  “The 
‘Corporation’ assumes a central position in modern economic life.  This is 
due mainly to the fact that major portions of our economic activities are 
performed by corporations.”136  Based on Supreme Court precedent that the 
ATS does not distinguish between classes of defendants, the failure of 
Congress to amend the statute, and the failure of the statute to explicitly 
exclude corporations, there is a complete absence of any indication that the 
intent of the drafters was to exclude corporate liability.  The next section will 
examine whether the Sosa decision really obligates courts to review 
international law in ascertaining whether corporations can have liability.  
B.  Do Courts Need to Examine the Question of Whether Corporations May 
Have Liability Under International Law? 
Kiobel relies substantially on the Sosa footnote for the proposition that 
courts must consult international law to ascertain whether a given defendant 
may be sued under the ATS.137  As the following section discusses, this 
interpretation of the footnote is incorrect.  
1.  Sosa Does Not Require Courts to Examine International Law to 
Determine Whether a Corporation Can Be a Defendant  
Opponents of corporate liability argue that, according to a footnote in the 
Sosa ruling,138 the question of corporate liability is controlled by 
international law and that, pursuant to same, there is no recognition of 
corporate liability.  The Kiobel court adopted this view and used it as a 
linchpin in their recent decision.139  However, the footnote does not explicitly 
                                                                                                                   
 134 And according to the 1907 opinion of Attorney General Charles Bonaparte, a corporation 
could be sued under the statute.  Mexican Boundary–Diversion of the Rio Grande, 26 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 250, 252–53 (1907). 
 135 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989).   
 136 Zohar Goshen, Controlling Corporate Agency Costs: A United States-Israeli 
Comparative View, 6 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 99 (1998). 
 137 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 128–29 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 138 See Ku, supra note 6, at 392 (“The Sosa Court made it clear that the courts hearing ATS 
claims must determine whether international law contains a universally accepted rule and 
defines that rule specifically and uncontroversially to include defendant’s alleged conduct.”).  
 139 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 127–31.  
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state or imply that an issue existed regarding whether a corporation has 
liability under international law.  Rather, the Court held in Sosa that 
international law controls the question of whether the specific conduct 
alleged gives rise to liability if the defendant is a private nonstate actor.140  
The context of the footnote and the reference to the D.C. Circuit’s Tel-Oren 
opinion make it clear that the Court was not questioning the viability of suing 
corporations.  In footnote 20 the Court states: “A related consideration is 
whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a 
given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor 
such as a corporation or individual.”141 
The context of the Sosa footnote demonstrates that Kiobel’s reliance on it 
is misplaced.  The footnote itself cites to the Tel-Oren ruling.142  In a 
concurring opinion in Tel-Oren, Judge Edwards grappled with the question 
of whether torture conducted by a nonstate actor was cognizable under the 
statute.143  After consulting sources of international law, Edwards asserted 
that a private terrorist organization could not be sued under the statute for 
torture since torture was not a jus cogens offense and that, therefore, only a 
state actor could be liable for such conduct.144  Edwards argued that since 
international law imposes obligations on private parties for jus cogens 
violations and because torture had not risen to the level, the nonstate actor 
terrorist entity was not liable.145  Judge Edwards did not distinguish between 
a juridical person, such as a terrorist organization or corporation, and a 
private individual.146  Such a distinction would be illogical.  The only issue is 
whether the actor is public or private (the latter encompassing individuals 
and organizations, such as corporations).  Sosa’s footnote stated that courts 
should examine international law to determine whether nonstate actors, such 
as corporations, have liability for the specific misconduct alleged.147  The 
footnote, in fact, supports the view that corporations may have liability since 
corporations are included as a type of private actor defendant within the 
scope of the statute.148 
Therefore, the Sosa footnote stands for the proposition that whether a 
private actor (including a corporation) has liability for the specific conduct 
(as opposed to requiring a state actor) is governed by international norms.  
                                                                                                                   
 140 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.20. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 144 Id. at 794–95 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.20. 
 148 Id. 
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This is hardly remarkable or surprising as courts have long held that, to 
determine whether a specific tortious act is cognizable under the statute, 
international law must be consulted.149  Such a holding makes perfect sense.  
Federal courts must consult customary international law to determine 
whether a violation of international law did in fact occur and this may 
depend on whether the actor was private (i.e., an individual or a corporation) 
or whether a state committed the act.  The next section will discuss whether 
it is U.S. domestic law or international law that controls America’s domestic 
enforcement of international law norms. 
2.  Under International Law, States Implement and Enforce Standards of 
International Law According to Their Own Domestic Legal Systems 
International law does not delineate the means of its domestic 
enforcement.150  As Judge Leval stated in his Kiobel concurrence, 
international law does not provide for, let alone mandate, the particular 
domestic implementation of liability for violations of international law.151  
Under international law, enforcement responsibilities lie with the sovereign 
and individual nations to establish the specific remedies to enforce 
international law.  As an example of this principle, the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism states: 
Each State Party, in accordance with its domestic legal 
principles, shall take the necessary measures to enable a legal 
entity located in its territory or organized under its laws to 
be held liable when a person responsible for the management 
or control of that legal entity has, in that capacity, committed 
an offence set forth in article 2.  Such liability may be 
criminal, civil or administrative.152 
Another example is the U.N. Convention Against Corruption.153  This 
international convention provides for a domestic remedy for punishing acts 
of corruption.  According to Article 38: 
                                                                                                                   
 149 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 150 See Giannini & Farbstein, supra note 6, at 124 (“Compliance and enforcement should not 
be conflated with the existence of the norm in question . . . . In contrast to the international 
norms, enforcement has traditionally been left to the domestic arena.”). 
 151 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 152 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., 
concurring).  
 152 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism art. 5(1), 
Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 (emphasis added). 
 153 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41. 
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Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary 
to encourage, in accordance with its domestic law, cooperation 
between, on the one hand, its public authorities, as well as its 
public officials, and, on the other hand, its authorities 
responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal 
offences.154 
These provisions corroborate Judge Leval’s view that international law 
provides for the nations to enforce international law according to their 
particular domestic principles.  
Judge Edwards’ concurring opinion in Tel-Oren supports this position.  
Addressing Judge Bork’s claim that the Tel-Oren plaintiffs could not sue 
absent a “right” to sue granted by international law, Judge Edwards noted 
that Judge Bork had absolutely no authority for this position.155  Judge 
Edwards stated the “lack of evidence [supporting this position] is not 
surprising, because it is clear that international law itself . . . does not require 
any particular reaction to violations of law . . . . Whether and how the United 
States wished to react to such violations are domestic questions.”156  
Judge Edwards continued: 
The law of nations thus permits countries to meet their 
international duties as they will.  In some cases, states have 
undertaken to carry out their obligations in agreed-upon ways, 
as in a United Nations Genocide Convention, which commits 
states to make genocide a crime or in bilateral or multilateral 
treaties.  Otherwise, states may make available their municipal 
laws in the manner they consider appropriate.  As a result, the 
law of nations never has been perceived to create or define the 
civil actions to be made available by each member of the 
community of nations; by consensus, the states leave that 
determination to their respective municipal laws.  Indeed, given 
the existing array of legal systems within the world, a 
consensus would be virtually impossible to reach—particularly 
on the technical accoutrements to an action—and it is hard 
                                                                                                                   
 154 Id. art. 38 (emphasis added). 
 155 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring). 
 156 Id. at 777–78 (citations omitted). 
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even to imagine that harmony ever would characterize this 
issue.157 
Since international law does not articulate, let alone obligate, the manner 
of its domestic enforcement, to read the Sosa footnote as preventing the ATS 
from enforcing international law vis-á-vis corporations seems 
counterintuitive at best.  Given the impossibility of achieving a consensus on 
its implementation, holding the ATS inapplicable to a corporation acts to 
defeat the goals of international law.  If a corporation cannot be held liable 
for violations of international law, the goals of international law are 
thwarted.   
Accordingly, international law determines whether the specific conduct 
alleged is of a sufficiently definitive character to constitute a violation of 
international law.  The domestic law of the United States controls the 
procedural aspects of its enforcement.  The United States allows corporate 
liability for tortious conduct, and, therefore, a corporation may be liable for 
violating international law in a suit filed under the ATS. 
C.  Do Corporations Have Obligations Under International Law?  
The ATS is a civil tort statute, and, as such, the issue of corporate 
criminal liability does not control the question of whether corporations have 
civil liability.  However, since Kiobel and other opponents of such liability 
reference criminal law, this Article addresses such liability.  Aside from 
being irrelevant, reliance on criminal law is misplaced because corporate 
actors are increasingly the subject of criminal liability.  One scholar has 
commented that “there is no support for the claim that corporate criminal 
liability is so outmoded or anomalous that it should be eliminated,” but rather 
that its use is increasing in frequency.158 
With respect to civil liability, a venerable international law treatise stated 
that corporations do have obligations under and are subject to international 
law: “Private individuals, or public and private corporations may . . . become 
the subjects of [international] law in regard to rights growing out of their 
international relations with foreign sovereigns and states, or their subjects 
and citizens.”159  This landmark treatise from a leading scholar is crystal 
clear and supports the conclusion that international law encompasses liability 
for corporations and private individuals as it does for states. 
                                                                                                                   
 157 Id. at 778 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 158 Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1481, 1493 (2009). 
 159 HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (6th ed. 1855). 
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1.  Criminal Liability  
Opponents of corporate liability correctly note that international criminal 
tribunals have not sought to prosecute juridical entities.  This lack of 
prosecution is offered as proof that international law does not recognize 
corporate responsibility.160  Accordingly, this fact is proffered as the reason 
that international tribunals have prosecuted individuals but not 
corporations.161   
The Kiobel majority, relying principally on various international 
tribunals,162 found that corporate criminal liability for international law 
violations has not been well-established.163  For example, NMT prosecuted 
corporate officials for international law crimes as private individuals.164  
However, in the NMT, the issue was whether private nonstate actors could 
be liable for certain violations such as crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.165  The NMT found that international law undeniably applies to 
private nonstate actors.166   
Kiobel and other corporate liability opponents place great emphasis on 
international criminal tribunals.  While it can be argued that the issue is not 
definitively resolved,167 criminal liability is fundamentally different and the 
fact that international criminal law tribunals did not prosecute corporations is 
irrelevant168 in the context of corporate civil liability in ATS litigation.  The 
                                                                                                                   
 160 See generally Ku, supra note 6, at 383 (citing to the Rome Statute’s limitation of liability 
to individuals).  But see Doe v. Exxon, 654 F.3d 11, 36 (2011) (“The Rome Statute, which 
created the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’), is properly viewed in the nature of a treaty 
and not as customary international law.”). 
 161 Ku, supra note 6, at 383. 
 162 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 132–37 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 163 Id. at 138.  For a detailed critique of Kiobel’s findings based upon an author’s belief the 
decision demonstrated “profound ignorance” and was full of “misinformation” about 
international law, see Mamolea, supra note 65, at 100–11.   
 164 See, e.g., The Zyklon B Case: Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, in 1 L. REP. OF 
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMS. 93 (1947), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/ 
Law-Reports_Vol-1.pdf (holding German industrialists liable for supplying Zyklon B, a 
poisonous gas, to Nazi concentration camps). 
 165 Id. at 103. 
 166 Id. at 102; see also United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide art. IV, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (“Persons committing 
genocide . . . shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public 
officials or private individuals.”). 
 167 See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 16 (2d ed. 2001) (“It 
remains unclear . . . whether international law generally imposes criminal responsibility on 
groups and organizations.”).  
 168 There is a colorable argument that the decision not to prosecute corporations bore no 
connection to international law but was undertaken for other reasons such as political and 
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ATS is not a law providing for criminal penalties and does not encompass 
criminal punishment.  The wording of the statute refers to a tort—there is no 
reference to criminal conduct.169  Reliance on criminal law is, therefore, not 
persuasive, and the fact that international criminal tribunals have not 
assessed the criminal liability of corporations is inconsequential. 
Another reason to reject the reliance on criminal tribunals is found in the 
dynamic explanation proffered by Giannini and Farbstein for why the NMT 
failed to prosecute corporations.  In their analysis of the NMT, Giannini and 
Farbstein explained that the prosecution of Farben was impossible due to the 
prior dismantling of the company.170  The company’s assets were confiscated 
and compensation was given to injured parties and some manufacturing 
facilities were physically destroyed.171  In other words,   
The fact that other remedies had already been enacted explains 
the Allies’ decision not to prosecute criminally the corporate 
entity. . . . This series of actions represents a deliberate and 
conscious decision by the Allied Control Council to sanction 
severely a juristic entity that had closely collaborated with and 
supported the Nazi regime.172 
Thus, Farben was given the ultimate sanction—“corporate death.”173  As 
noted by Giannini and Farbstein, this ultimate punishment preceded the 
criminal prosecutions.174  Thus, corporate liability opponents’ reliance on the 
lack of NMT prosecutions is misplaced.   
Kiobel’s belief that “[f]rom the beginning . . . the principle of individual 
liability for violations of international law has been limited to natural 
persons—not ‘juridical’ persons such as corporations” is not without 
critics.175  Professor Paust refers to Kiobel’s analysis as “manifest error” that 
led to the wrong holding.176  Historically, in contrast to the United States,177 
                                                                                                                   
international strategic motives.  See Mamolea, supra note 65, at 92 (claiming that corporations 
were not prosecuted by the NMT due to political and legal expediency).   
 169 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 170 Giannini & Farbstein, supra note 6, at 129. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 129–30. 
 173 Id. at 129. 
 174 Id. at 130 (“To contend that the lack of charges against the corporation indicates anything 
about corporate liability under international law ignores the simple fact that it made little 
sense to sue [Farben], given the penalties already imposed and the reality that [Farben’s] 
remaining assets were held by the Allied Control Council itself by that time.”). 
 175 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010).   
 176 Paust, supra note 130, at 977 n.1, 978 n.2. 
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various continental European nations’ legal regimes excluded corporations 
from criminal liability preferring to impose liability on individuals as 
opposed to a legal body, such as a corporation.178  But, as corporations have 
become more embedded in our globalized world, this view has already 
changed.179  Professor Lederman describes the shift: 
The last two decades have created a new socio-political-
economic reality, characterized by a thriving common market 
in Europe, changes in the political regimes of Eastern Europe, 
intensive privatization processes in many countries that shifted 
many areas of activity to the non-governmental sector, and the 
creation of mega-multinational-corporations that are the result 
of acquisitions, mergers and takeovers.  In a process that 
peaked in the second half of this century, legal bodies have 
actually assumed control of all forms of commerce and 
industry, to the extent that no economic endeavor is deemed 
possible without their involvement.  This socio-economic 
reality has dictated, to a large extent, the change in the law’s 
approach to the imposition of penal liability on corporations. 
Policy setters in various legislative and law enforcement 
bodies sensed that attaining effective, and mainly trouble-free, 
control of the economy through criminal law depends on a 
sweeping subordination of the legal bodies themselves, as far 
as possible, to criminal proceedings.  All this without 
restricting the scope of the personal criminal liability 
incumbent on management ranks or on those actually involved 
in breaking the law.180 
In short, the realities of our interconnected world and the immense 
financial power wielded by large corporations militate strongly in favor of 
                                                                                                                   
 177 The fact that U.S. law permits such liability provides yet an additional reason for the 
irrelevancy of the criminal law tribunals.  As discussed, international law leaves to the 
individual states the specific means of its enforcement.  Moreover, the domestic laws of the 
United States permit corporate liability.  See supra Part II.B.2.  Thus, reference to 
international tribunals is misplaced. 
 178 Eli Lederman, Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and 
Imitation Toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 641, 
643 (2000). 
 179 See, e.g., Beale, supra note 158, at 1493 (“[S]everal European jurisdictions that 
previously made no provision for corporate criminal liability have created such liability, and 
others have expanded existing bases of corporate liability for crimes.”). 
 180 Lederman, supra note 178, at 644 (emphasis added). 
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subjecting corporate conduct to criminal liability.  For example, over twenty 
years ago, the Council of Europe181 recognized this need and recommended 
the adoption of corporate criminal liability in European Community 
nations.182  Further, the Netherlands had already commenced allowing 
corporate criminal liability before the European Council recommendation, 
while others subsequently adopted the change.183 
As Professor Lederman notes, “The Dutch courts had seemingly 
anticipated this recommendation and, in the mid-1970s, shifted course in this 
direction.  France, on the other hand, changed its criminal law on this issue 
following the recommendation, and in the early 1990s erased the prohibition 
against rendering corporations (personnes morales) criminally liable.”184  
Lederman notes that in the 1990s 
legal bodies in England have been charged with manslaughter, 
and some have even been convicted . . . . In Israel also, this 
struggle has finally been decided.  For the first time, an explicit 
provision concerning corporate liability has been legislated in 
the general section of the criminal code, and the Supreme Court 
has stated that “in principle, there is no reason for failing to 
impose criminal liability on a corporation for the perpetration 
of manslaughter.”185   
According to Beale, criminal liability is fast becoming the rule rather than 
the exception.186 
Beginning in the 1970s, nations throughout western European 
[sic] began creating or expanding corporate criminal liability, 
rather than contracting or eliminating it.  Some of the 
legislation affected small nations.  For example, legislation in 
                                                                                                                   
 181 European Council, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/european-coun 
cil/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 31, 2011). 
 182 Committee of Ministers, Council of Europe, Recommendation on Liability of Enterprises 
Having Legal Personality for Offences Committed in the Exercise of their Activities, 
Recommendation No. R (88) 18 (Oct. 1988). 
 183 See Lederman, supra note 178, at 645.   
 184 Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 185 Id. at 645–46 (footnote omitted). 
 186 Beale, supra note 158, at 1493.  A significant exception is Germany.  However, even in 
Germany, corporations may be fined through administrative bodies and supervised by 
criminal courts.  Moreover, an active debate is underway with scholars arguing for actual 
corporate criminal liability.  See Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in 
Western Europe Tell Us About American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 89, 123–26 (2004).   
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the Netherlands and Denmark provided that corporations are, in 
general, liable for all offenses within each nation’s general 
criminal code.  In 1995, Finland imposed a new form of 
negligence-based criminal liability on corporations, and in 
2003 Switzerland, for the first time, imposed criminal liability 
on corporations.  But perhaps the most significant legislation 
was adopted in 1992 when France enacted a revised penal code 
that provided, for the first time, for corporate criminal liability.  
More recently, a 2000 amendment effectively expanded the 
scope of corporate liability under French law.  Additionally, 
transnational European organizations have recommended that 
their member states provide for criminal or quasi-criminal 
liability on organizations for specific types of offenses.187  
This emphasis on corporate criminal liability for bribery is exemplified in 
the United Kingdom’s anti-bribery law.  Pursuant to U.K. law, there is a 
separate offense for commercial enterprises for the failure to prevent the 
bribery—an offense distinct and separate from the act of bribery itself.188  
A “relevant commercial organization”189 is guilty of an offense if a person 
associated with the organization bribes another person intending to obtain or 
retain business or an advantage in the conduct of business for the 
organization.190  Pursuant to the U.K. anti-bribery law, corporations are 
included in the law.191  Another example is Australia, where corporations 
may also have liability.192  Further, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) anti-bribery convention also 
demonstrates an adoption of corporate liability.193 
A recent example is the Trafigura case.  In June 2010, defendant 
corporation Trafigura was fined and held criminally responsible by a Dutch 
court for the impermissible dumping of toxic waste.194  The case arose from a 
                                                                                                                   
 187 Beale, supra note 158, at 1493–94 (footnotes omitted). 
 188 Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7(1) (Eng.). 
 189 Id. § 7(5) (a “relevant commercial organization” includes U.K corporations and 
partnerships as well as corporations and partnerships from anywhere in the world that conduct 
business in the U.K.). 
 190 Id. § 7(1). 
 191 Id. § 7(5). 
 192 FOREIGN BRIBERY, AUSTL. GOV’T 4 (2011), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WW 
W/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE097801FF)~n0000Info+paper.pdf/$
file/n0000Info+paper.pdf. 
 193 See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions art. 8, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Anti-Bribery Convention]. 
 194 Trafigura Found Guilty of Exporting Toxic Waste, BBC (July 23, 2010), http://www.bbc. 
co.uk/news/world-africa-10735255. 
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2006 illegal dumping of toxic waste in the Ivory Coast and the resulting 
injuries to thousands of people.195  The injured parties were poisoned from 
the waste leading to deaths and serious injuries.196   
In the United States, corporate criminal liability has long been recognized 
and is well embedded in the American judicial system:   
The existence of a corporate compliance program, even one 
that specifically prohibited the very conduct in question, does 
not absolve the corporation from criminal liability under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior.  See United States v. Basic 
Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[A] 
corporation may be held criminally responsible for antitrust 
violations committed by its employees if they were acting 
within the scope of their authority, or apparent authority, and 
for the benefit of the corporation, even if . . . such acts were 
against corporate policy or express instructions.”).197 
Both federal and state courts in the United States routinely have corporate 
defendants in their courtrooms defending a variety of criminal prosecutions. 
Accordingly, even in the criminal liability context, corporate liability is 
increasingly the norm.198  For example, international law recognizes the 
importance of corporate responsibility in the areas of terrorist financing and 
money laundering.199  With respect to international bribery, there is a strong 
global effort toward combating corruption, corporate responsibility, and 
liability.200  The preceding section demonstrated the essentially unanimous 
                                                                                                                   
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-28.800(B) (2008), available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm#9-28.800.   
 198 See Bert Swart, International Trends Towards Establishing Some Form of Punishment 
for Corporations, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 947, 948 (2008) (explaining how international law is 
embracing corporate criminal liability). 
 199 See United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 5(1)(b), G.A. 
Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000); OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra 
note 193, arts. 1(2), 2; S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004) (calling on nations 
to deny aid to anyone financing terrorism); S.C. Res. 1373, para. 1(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 
(Sept. 28, 2001) (calling on nations to prohibit terrorist funding); International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/109, art. 2(1), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999) (seeking to criminalize the financing of terrorism). 
 200 See generally Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999, Europ. T.S. No. 174 
(outlining steps to be taken in the civil context in the international fight against corruption); 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, Europ. T.S. No. 173 (outlining steps 
to be taken in the criminal context in the international fight against corruption); Group of 
States Against Corruption (GRECO), COUNCIL EUR., http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ 
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trend towards and perhaps norm for the imposition of corporate criminal 
liability.  The next section explores how corporate liability for civil damages 
already exists.   
2.  Civil Liability  
The vast majority of jurisdictions permit civil suits against corporations.  
Given that ATS suits against corporations are civil rather than criminal, an 
examination of whether corporate civil liability is an accepted norm of 
international law is most relevant.  Unlike criminal liability, there is no doubt 
about a juridical organization’s civil liability for causing tort damage.  
In a nutshell, as pointed out by a recent report of the 
International Commission of Jurists on corporate complicity in 
international crimes, “[i]n every jurisdiction, despite 
differences in terminology and approach, an actor can be held 
liable under the law of civil remedies if through negligent or 
intentional conduct it causes harm to someone else.”  Civil 
liability therefore gives more latitude than criminal 
liability . . . (1) it applies indiscriminately to natural and legal 
persons whereas criminal law often restricts the liability of 
legal persons; (2) the characterization of a negligent or 
intentional conduct is not subject to the principle of legality; 
(3) it operates on a lower standard of proof than does criminal 
liability and; (4) it offers an independent source of financial 
redress for victims.201  
                                                                                                                   
greco/general/members_en.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (listing members of GRECO); 
ADB/OECD, ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION PLAN FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 2 (2001), available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/24/35021642.pdf (outlining concerns with corruption and 
corporate responsibility); African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
art. 7, July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 (listing objectives of convention dealing with corruption); 
Governance and Anti-Corruption, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTER 
NAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20040922~menuPK:34480~pagePK:34370~theSitePK:4607,00.
html (last updated July 2011) (providing an overview of the World Bank’s anti-corruption 
protocols); United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 153, at iii–iv (detailing 
the reasons for creation of an anti-corruption instrument).  
 201 Régis Bismuth, Mapping a Responsibility of Corporations for Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Sailing Between International and Domestic Legal Orders, 38 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 203, 221 (2010) (citation omitted); see also Jordan J. Paust, The Reality of 
Private Rights, Duties, and Participation in the International Legal Process, 25 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 1229, 1237–39 (2004) (describing “universal jurisdiction for criminal or civil sanctions” for 
private actors). 
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Corporations also enjoy rights and face liabilities under international law 
including those arising out of international treaties.202  Illustrative are the 
rights conferred by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.203  Indeed, corporations have filed claims 
in the European Court of Human Rights for an infringement on corporate 
rights.204 
One of the most important treaties used frequently by both international 
corporations and states are bilateral investment treaties (BITs).  These have 
become quite prominent in international law.  “BITs and similar cross-
national instruments, such as Chapter 11 in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (‘NAFTA’), have rapidly proliferated over the past few 
decades.”205  Corporations routinely file claims under investment treaties.206  
The 
[m]ost prominent [forum for these disputes] is the World 
Bank’s International Center for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (‘ICSID’).  Many . . . tribunals adopt a relatively 
progressive approach in interpreting BIT clauses, intervening 
in numerous instances in local regulatory or legislative acts that 
are viewed as conflicting with such cross-national legal 
norms.207  
Corporations’ claims for damages based upon violations of investment 
treaties are decided under international law.208  This demonstrates that 
                                                                                                                   
 202 See Charles M. Spofford, Third Party Judgment and International Economic Transactions, 
in 113 RECUEIL DES COURS 117, 177–81 (1964) (utilizing exemplars from international 
investment treaty arbitration wherein investor corporations arbitrate against host states for 
alleged violations of treaty rights).  
 203 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
 204 See, e.g., Agrotexim and Others v. Greece, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) (1995) (holding 
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 208 See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 
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corporations are invoking international law to their benefit, since the 
claimant is alleging a host state’s breach of its international treaty 
obligations.  For example, in 1999, Methanex Corporation filed claims under 
NAFTA against the United States, alleging that California’s MTBE (a 
gasoline additive and water contaminant) reduction plan constituted unequal 
and unfair treatment and would result in an illegal taking of its “property 
right.”209  Although the claim was ultimately denied, Methanex’s claim was 
brought as all investment treaty claims are—pursuant to international law.210  
The Methanex arbitration tribunal stated: 
[Under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice,] Methanex has rightly emphasised the reference in 
Article 1131(1) to “applicable rules of international law”, and 
in this respect Methanex relies on Article 38(1) of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice.  It provides:.  
 
“The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall 
apply:  
 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting 
states;  
 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law;  
 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations;  
 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions 
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
                                                                                                                   
NAFTA Article 102(2) provides that the Agreement must be interpreted and applied in the light 
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 209 Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, In the Matter of an International 
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the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.”211  
Thus, investment treaty arbitration panels use international conventions, 
customs, and general principles of law as outlined sources of international 
law per Article 38(1) and represent a clear example of corporations invoking 
international law.212  If a corporation has the right to invoke rights under 
international law, a corporation should also be subject to civil liability under 
international law.  Predictably, with rights come obligations.  To confer 
rights on corporations without the associated obligations is not reasonable.  
Vesting corporations with rights, such as the right to file claims, while 
simultaneously exonerating them for tort damage created by violating 
international law, does not make sense and, moreover, encourages violation 
of international law. 
D.  The Sharp Line of Demarcation Between States and Corporations No 
Longer Exists: The Corporation as a Quasi-Public Actor 
Opponents of corporate liability may point to the historical dichotomy 
between “corporations” and “states” as underpinning the argument that only 
states have obligations under international law.  As Professor Alford notes, in 
the past international law was relegated to sovereign nations.213  Therefore, 
“ ‘sovereign States exclusively are International Persons—i.e. subjects of 
International Law’ and neither ‘monarchs, diplomatic envoys, private 
individuals . . . churches . . . chartered companies, nor . . . organized 
wandering tribes’ enjoyed the status of ‘International Persons’ who are 
‘subject[s] of the Law of Nations.’ ”214 
According to liability opponents, the ATS is only applicable to “states” as 
states are the principal actors in “international law.”  According to the Kiobel 
majority, “customary international law includes only ‘those standards, rules 
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 212 See, e.g., Apotex Inc. v. United States of America, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://www.state. 
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Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992)). 
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or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an 
individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their common 
good and/or in dealings inter se.’ ”215 
In essence, opponents claim that international law is only concerned with 
the rights and obligations of states.216  While acknowledging that private 
individuals may have obligations for certain conduct, such as war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide, a distinction is made between private 
individuals and private corporations.217  Describing individual liability for 
violations of international humanitarian law as “revolutionary,” Kiobel 
explained that international law only concerns state to state relations.218  
Even when international law recognizes private actor liability in limited 
circumstances it is in the context of states’ obligations to its citizens.219  
Therefore, since corporations are private actors and the purpose of 
international law is to regulate conduct and relations between states, 
corporations cannot have obligations under international law. 
However, there is academic disagreement.  As noted by Professor Paust: 
For centuries, there have been vast numbers of formally 
recognized actors in the international legal process other than 
the state, although far too many assume incorrectly that 
traditional or classical international law had been merely state-
to-state and that under traditional international law individuals 
and various other nonstate actors did not have rights or duties 
based directly in international agreements or customary 
international law.220  
According to Paust, there exists a significant array of geographically 
diverse nonstate actors which have been subject to international law.221  He 
                                                                                                                   
 215 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting IIT v. 
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describes the attempt to limit obligations to formal states as a “mendacious 
myth”222 and cites to various circumstances where nonstate actors have 
indeed been subject to international law.223  
However, assuming arguendo Kiobel’s reference to international law 
governing the corporate liability question is correct, notwithstanding any 
traditional relegation of international law to “states,” corporations are now 
crucial actors in international business and have taken the mantle of 
economic leadership and development once relegated primarily to nation 
states.  As Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence in Citizens United, 
corporations are “the principal agents of the modern free economy.”224  This 
fact alone militates strongly in favor of rejecting a formalistic “no liability” 
view. 
In addition, scholars have criticized any distinction as having been 
completely wrong.  For example, Professor Paust states:  
[F]or the last 250 years, international law has not been merely 
state-to-state.  At best, claims to the contrary have been 
profoundly mistaken.  At worst, they have been part of layered 
lies and attempts by malevolent myth-mongers to exclude and 
oppress others, to deny responsibility, or to support radical 
revisionist ambitions.  A claim that the only actors with formal 
participatory roles or recognized rights and duties other than 
the state have been natural individual persons is similarly 
mistaken.  For example, international law [reaches] such non-
individual entities and other actors as a company, corporation, 
union, vessel, courthouse, insurgent, belligerent, tribe, free city, 
people, and nation, among others.225 
Further, as a New York district court noted, “Limiting civil liability to 
individuals while exonerating the corporation directing the individual’s 
action . . . makes little sense in today’s world.”226 
While, traditionally, a line of demarcation existed, that line is becoming 
blurred.  Corporations are becoming active private actors in the public arena, 
taking a role in traditionally state functions.  The public functions of 
education, policing, and defense operations no longer depend exclusively on 
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public actors within a specific nation state; they are affected by private 
corporations conducting business across borders, often as quasi-public 
actors.  Indeed, large multinational corporations have been referred to as 
virtual “states.”227  As such, there is no reason to treat corporations 
differently than states.228 
Simultaneously, the private sector functions of providing private liquidity 
and capital market investment are no longer the exclusive province of private 
entities.  States are operating in the business world as private actors through 
vehicles such as sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), whereby they actively 
invest in world equity markets,229 demonstrating convincingly that states are 
involved in the private sector.  States also own private sector businesses 
through State Owned Enterprises (SOEs).230  Thus, the traditional role of the 
private sector is no longer relegated exclusively to corporations. 
1.  Corporations Acting in the Public Sphere  
Those with the view that states are the principal actors within their 
boundaries must recognize that states often outsource to corporations the 
performance of traditionally state services.  There are various traditional state 
                                                                                                                   
 227 See Douglas J. Wood, Say Hello to the World’s New Sovereign Nations: Facebook, 
Google and RIM; Nations? Bah, They Can’t Control ME! Welcome to War, Virtual World-
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Perspective, 6 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RIGHTS 262, ¶ 1 (2008), at http://www.law.northwestern. 
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become ever larger and more powerful since the 1970s, often surpassing the economic power 
and influence of states.”). 
 229 Joel Slawotsky, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Emerging Financial Superpowers: How U.S. 
Regulators Should Respond, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1239, 1239, 1246–48 (2009) (noting SWFs’ 
increasing investment in private equity).  
 230 See Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience, 19 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 13 (2010) (“State-owned enterprises (‘SOE’s), newly 
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roles which are increasingly being undertaken by private entities including 
the.  These roles span the gamut, including health care, welfare, education, 
prisons, police, imprisonment, military defense, and other traditional 
governmental services.231  Historically state roles have been replaced by 
corporations and the depth of outsourcing of public functions is receiving 
increased attention.232  “The most common form of privatization in this arena 
has been outsourcing, an arrangement in which the government contracts 
with a private entity to render goods or services previously provided by the 
government.”233   
 The privatization of prisons serves as an example of this 
outsourcing phenomenon.  Prisons are no longer the exclusive 
domain of the state.  Commencing in the 1980s and 1990s, 
“governments began to rely more heavily upon the private 
sector for the provision of corrections services for adults.  As a 
result, a significant number of state and federal prisoners are 
now in the custody of private entities.”234 
Indeed, corporations are influential in shaping decisions of nation 
states.235  One scholar notes, “The world has . . . changed, and long-standing 
legal concepts are being increasingly challenged by dramatic cross-border 
developments that no longer allow domestic land laws to exist in isolation, 
but instead present pressing issues of cross-influences, regionalism, and 
universalism.”236   
Although states were once the primary vehicle to impose obligations, now 
corporations are taking a substantial role.  An example “is the manner in 
which the enforcement of human rights in the crucial area of labour rights is 
moved from states and international organizations to market actors via the 
idea of [corporate social responsibility].”237  
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Another example is governmental outsourcing to corporations of drafting 
health policy and regulations.  For example, the U.K. has asked food 
corporations to assist drafting policy on food and alcohol.238 
In addition to wielding enormous economic power, 
corporations increasingly engage in state-like activity as a 
result of the privatization of traditional state functions (e.g., the 
management of prisons, public welfare programs, public 
utilities, and wars) and the tendency of corporations to elect to 
operate in environments where state power is weak or non-
existent.239 
Given the fact that corporations are acting much like public actors it 
would be unfair if a private actor could obtain immunity for civil damages by 
virtue of it being a corporate entity.  There would also be substantial 
incentive for misconduct if the actor knows there is an exemption of civil 
liability.240  Indeed, as noted by Tyler Giannini and Susan Farbstein, the 
Kiobel holding “potentially incentivizes states to abdicate state duties to 
corporations because incorporation may effectively insulate all parties—
states, armed groups, and corporations—from liability.”241   
2.  States Acting in the Private Sphere 
A similar shift has occurred in the private sector.  The historical activities 
of the private sector, including investment in the equity and debt markets, the 
ownership of shares in other private sector corporations, and providing 
investment capital, are no longer solely the role of the private corporation.242  
States are increasingly taking on a private actor role.243  The emergence of 
SWFs as financial superstars is one example.  SWFs, and their state owners, 
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are increasingly acquiring ownership stakes in corporations all over the 
globe.244  Whether a SWF controls, dominates, or outright buys a 
corporation, there can be no doubt that such activity represents involvement 
in a traditionally nonstate activity resulting in states conducting business as 
private actors. 
Another example of the blurring of the demarcation is the SOE, which is 
often a corporate entity.245  SOEs are involved in direct or partial ownership 
of business projects and joint venture partnerships with other states and 
corporations on a global basis.246  Again, this constitutes a form of traditional 
private corporate activity being conducted by states as private actors 
conducting business on an international scale.   
Since states are engaging in private actor functions the distinctions 
between states and corporations are eviscerating.  Accordingly, the 
theoretical underpinning for holding only states as bearing international legal 
obligations has similarly been largely eliminated: 
This participation of states directly in markets (production, 
ownership, finance and the like) is not merely in the old and 
now fairly tame form of public, central planning-based, 
political regimes, or the sort of ownership that traditionally 
constituted state enterprises, i.e. mercantilist/Marxist-
Leninist undertakings with a long and well understood history 
and purpose.  What distinguishes this sovereign activity from 
its mid-20th Century form is the willingness of states not only 
to limit their control of internal economies, but also to invest 
their financial wealth outside their national borders.  In this 
respect, states assume the very role of the private economic 
actors that they once feared so much.  The 21st Century is 
witnessing a dramatic rise in the willingness of states to project 
economic power both at home and in host states through the 
same economic vehicles that threatened the states’ power in the 
20th Century.  The facilitating cause of this change in 
approach is the creation of the very system that frees economic 
actors from the constraints of territory and more closely binds 
public actors thereto.  Just as private economic entities may 
now cross borders to affect transactions that maximize their 
wealth, so states are now discovering that they might do the 
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same thing.  Economic globalization does not exclude private 
market participants from its system of freely moving capital.  
Just as private actors are subject to the regulation and control of 
the sovereign in whose territories they act, states acting outside 
their borders as participants in local economic activity assume 
a similar character.  Consequently, some states seem to have 
become, to some extent, pools of national economic wealth, the 
power of which matches or exceeds their traditional sovereign 
power.247 
Thus, the roles of corporations as purely private actors and that of states 
as purely public actors are no longer in effect.248  Each distinct role has been 
replaced with a mixed role.  Given the reality of corporations being wealthier 
than states, our interconnected and interdependent world, and the blurring of 
the distinction of roles between states and corporations, the failure to impose 
obligations upon corporations because corporations are distinct from states is 
no longer valid.  “Traditional legal concepts are thus being exceedingly 
challenged by recent geopolitical, economic, and intellectual factors that no 
longer allow land laws to exist in isolation.  Rather, these challenges present 
pressing issues of strong cross-influences, regionalism, and universalism.”249  
The mixture of state and corporate roles unquestionably prevents states from 
being purely public actors and prevents corporations from being purely 
private actors.  To impose legal obligations on states but disallow these same 
obligations on corporations is makes little sense in today’s world where both 
states and corporations have similar or even identical interests.  This 
coalition of interests underscores the blurring of the distinction between 
states and corporations.  
In international relations, there are no enduring values as in the 
case of interpersonal relations.  For states, there are mostly 
shifting interests of a passing nature.  The states’ goals of 
power and wealth are in frequent contrast with the human goals 
of justice and peace aspirations.  The protagonists of state 
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interests all too often prevail over those advocating justice and 
peace.250 
Similar to state interests, corporations also have no enduring values other 
than goals of financial power and wealth.  Why should corporations be 
treated differently particularly in today’s global economy where states act in 
the private realm and private corporations do so in the public arena?  There is 
a lack of compelling reasons supporting the view that courts should treat 
corporations differently so as to exempt them from liability.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Given the evolving notion of states as private actors and the implications 
for private corporations, the Supreme Court will need to address the issue at 
some point.  Because of the circuit split and the importance of corporate 
liability, the Court may very well accept review of Kiobel or, alternatively, 
may grant cert in a different ATS suit, such as Exxon or Flomo, particularly 
if the court wants to address corporate liability alongside the issue of the 
standard for secondary liability.  
The high stakes and significance of the corporate liability issue increase 
the likelihood that the Supreme Court will accept at least one corporate suit 
to resolve the liability question.  Substantial support exists for the view that 
corporations should be liable under the ATS.  These reasons include: the 
dearth of proof that corporate defendants were excluded by the statute’s 
drafters; the Kiobel court’s misplaced reliance on the Sosa footnote; the lack 
of an enforcement mandate in international law; that corporations are subject 
to civil law and criminal law; and the blurring of the once sharp public-
private distinction.  All of these points undermine the argument that 
international law is relegated only to states, and that the Court should, 
therefore, reject corporate immunity in ATS suits.  
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